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In this article, I examine and compare discourses and strategies mobilized by 
pro- and anti-independence movements in the UK and in Spain in order to assess 
how the EU as an actor or as a political institutional context affects 
contemporary secessionist politics within member states. I argue that the EU 
provides a complex web of opportunities and constraints for pro- and anti-
independence movements in the UK. The EU is both an arena for articulating 
claims and a source of allies, while appeals to images, histories and experiences 
of the EU and other European states can be mobilized discursively in reasoning 
for or against secession. I also argue that, overall, the EU appears to have 
provided more opportunities than constraints for anti-independence activists. In 
an indication of the relevance of Europe in contemporary secession debates, the 
article shows that arguments and beliefs about Europe were actively employed 
by activists to justify or criticize the premises underpinning reasons to support or 
reject secession, although more research is needed to determine whether these 
arguments about Europe resonated with voting publics in Scotland and 
Catalonia.  
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The break-up of states has international implications and, especially since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, it has become a concern for the European Union (EU). The EU 
has sought to influence secession outcomes in processes as diverse as the 
independence of the Baltic States from the Soviet Union; those following the bloody 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and later division of Serbia; and the separation of regions in 
Georgia and Ukraine (Coppieters, 2007 and 2010; Caplan, 2005). It has exerted 
pressure through measures ranging from diplomacy, enlargement conditionality, 
targeted sanctions, arms embargos and peacekeeping missions. The existence of 
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around 20 significant independence movements in Europe means the EU is likely to 
remain implicated in secession processes (Coppieters, 2010: 240). 
In addition to EU actions targeting non-EU and applicant states, the EU may 
influence secession within existing member states. Independence advocates may need 
to convincingly argue that their new state will easily join international organizations, 
fundamentally affecting economic prosperity and security (Tierney, 2013: 370). 
Indeed, many have observed that the prospect that a new state could continue to be 
part of the EU’s common market and seek protection under its latent security 
umbrella appeared to reduce the costs and risks of separation (e.g. Keating and 
McGarry, 2001; Hepburn, 2010: 76). Minority nationalists have long used European 
integration as a political resource ‘grafted onto their political discourse’ to bolster 
demands for autonomy (Lynch, 1996: 16-17; Hepburn, 2010). The EU may also affect 
secession processes in less direct ways. The European sovereign debt crisis, for 
instance, may strengthen secessionist movements. In the Catalan case, various studies 
argue that the severity of the economic crisis in Spain bolstered economic arguments 
for secession and thereby helped turn the predominantly autonomist Catalan 
nationalist movement into a secessionist one (Guibernau, 2013: 383; Blas, 2013: 399; 
Serrano, 2013: 524 and 534). Others expect ‘contagion effects’, or independence for 
one stateless nation in Europe to encourage other highly mobilized movements to also 
pursue independence (Tierney, 2013: 359).  
Together, these arguments suggest that the EU, either as an actor or as a 
politico-institutional context, may play a role in the politics of secession in Europe. 
As such these arguments can be considered arguments about “Europeanization”, or 
the ways in which European integration affects politics, policies and institutions 
within European states. In this article, I examine discourses and strategies mobilized 
by pro- and anti-independence movements in the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain in 
order to examine how the EU as an actor or as a political institutional context affects 
contemporary secessionist politics within member states.  
Independence debates in Scotland and Catalonia are the highest profile cases 
of secession movements within the EU at present. Scotland held an independence 
referendum on 18 September 2014, where the ‘No’ campaign won with 55% of the 
vote. In Catalonia, debates on independence top the political agenda, even if legal 
disputes between Catalan and Spanish authorities mean the promised November 2014 
independence consultation may not take place. More importantly, the cases permit use 
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of a ‘most similar’ research design. Both Spain and the UK are longstanding EU 
members and leading advocates of independence in both Catalonia and Scotland 
favour immediate EU membership. These are cases, as Guibernau puts it, where a 
form of ‘emancipatory nationalism’ has emerged, which is a ‘democratic type of 
nationalism […] defending the nation’s right to decide upon its political future by 
democratic means’ (2013: 372).   
An advantage of focusing on discourse and political and argumentative 
strategies is that it acknowledges the importance of public deliberation for secession 
processes within the EU. In Europe, the break-up of states has taken various forms 
that included violent civil war (e.g. Yugoslavia), peaceful, but elite-led, negotiations 
(e.g. Czechoslovakia) and external intervention (e.g. Kosovo and potentially Ukraine). 
Nevertheless, within EU member states, impetus for the most significant 
contemporary independence movements is channelled through democratic processes, 
especially the electoral success of minority nationalist parties and campaigns for 
independence referenda. Consequently, the public sphere, and democratic process of 
deliberation therein, have become important fora in which secession outcomes are 
negotiated. In this context, it is useful to analyse debates on secession as a form of 
‘practical reasoning’ in which agents conduct a critical dialogue to define an 
appropriate response to the circumstances in which they find themselves in a way that 
achieves goals realizing their values (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 45). Analysis 
of secessionist discourse, understood here as ‘ways of representing aspects of the 
world which can generally be identified with different positions or perspectives of 
different groups of social actors’ (ibid: 82) can contribute to causal explanations of 
political outcomes insofar as discourse provides reasons for action (ibid: 80 and 95). 
More specifically, ‘discourses provide agents with premises (i.e. beliefs about the 
circumstances of action, instrumental beliefs, values and goals) for justifying, 
criticizing, and on this basis, deciding on action […]’ (ibid: 95). 
While the article draws from existing studies highlighting a role for Europe in 
secession processes, it adopts a predominantly explorative research design informed 
by “grounded theory”. This method aims to develop theory from coding, 
categorization and comparison of empirical data and this article uses a constructivist 
variant (Charmaz, 2006). Constructivist grounded theory is particularly suitable for 
analysis of discourse and employs an “abductive” approach, which permits 
formulation of empirically-derived, but theoretically-grounded, hypotheses, and thus 
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avoids important shortcomings of inductive reasoning characteristic of earlier variants 
of grounded theory (ibid: 186). It also has the advantage of providing opportunities to 
search for new hypotheses explicitly informed by existing theoretical research on 
Europeanization.  
To this end, I analyse references to Europe in public statements by pro- and 
anti-independence public authorities, political parties and civil society groups in a 
sample of around 250 newspaper articles drawn from the ‘Scottish independence’ 
section of the British daily newspaper The Guardian (between 25 May 2012 and 11 
March 2014), and the ‘Catalan consultation’ section of the Spanish daily El País 
(between 24 October 2012 and 22 January 2014). To deal with possible biases in 
newspaper reporting, I also analyse statements relating to European affairs and 
independence in pro- and anti-independence campaign websites, posters, pamphlets, 
public speeches, press releases and documents published by campaign participants. 
These include: material published by civil society groups—such as the pro-
independence Yes Scotland (2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d), the Scottish Independence 
Convention (2014) and Catalan National Assembly (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) and the 
anti-Scottish independence group, Better Together (2014a, 2014b); major policy 
statements against independence by the Spanish government (Gobierno de España, 
2014) and the British government (Her Majesty’s Government, 2014); speeches 
(Salmond, 2013a), policy statements (Scottish Government 2013a), press releases 
(Generalitat de Catalunya 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; 2014a; 2014b; 2014d) and 
parliamentary declarations (Catalan Parliament 2013) of pro-independence 
administrations in Scotland and Catalonia.  
I begin with a brief discussion of key Europeanization concepts that emerged 
as relevant in the empirical research. I then turn to examine the efforts of pro- and 
anti-independence actors to influence the views of EU actors and other 
(predominantly) European states on the terms of accession for hypothetical Scottish or 
Catalan states to the EU. The next section examines discursive interventions by EU 
actors, such as the European Commission president, in domestic secession debates. 
The final section addresses discursive mobilization of the experience of the European 
sovereign debt crisis and “lesson drawing” from the experience of other European 
states to strengthen arguments for or against independence.  
I argue that the EU provides a complex web of opportunities and constraints 
for both pro- and anti-independence movements in the UK and Spain. On the one 
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hand, the EU’s multi-level polity provides opportunities for both kinds of movements 
to search for allies and to reinforce or challenge dominant discourses in the EU which 
are unsympathetic to independence movements within democratic states. 
Furthermore, Europe can be “used” discursively to bolster domestic campaigns 
through mobilization of negatives images of integration (such as the sovereign debt 
crisis) and horizontal referencing to positive experiences of secession elsewhere in 
Europe. Nevertheless, the EU appears to have given more significant opportunities to 
anti-independence campaigners than to their pro-independence counterparts in both 
the UK and Spain. Pro-independence actors failed to obtain support from sufficiently 
authoritative European actors, which refused to assure voters that on the central 
campaign issue of EU membership, a future independent Catalan or Scottish state 
would join in a timely manner or on favourable terms.  
 
1. Europeanization and secession 
Europeanization research focuses on the impact of European integration—and most 
often the EU—on the domestic arena, particularly member state politics, policies and 
institutions. EU treaties do not regulate formation of new states, even if they may 
affect what happens after a new state is born (Tierney, 2013; Caplan, 2005). As such, 
the concepts and research strategies associated with a bottom-up (rather than a top-
down) Europeanization approach are more appropriate for this research (Lynggaard, 
2011). A bottom-up approach focuses on changes that may occur without “misfit” or 
“pressure to adapt” to Europe, such as how domestic agents may “capture” or 
influence EU institutions or policies, or use EU discourse strategically to bring about 
preferred domestic changes (ibid: 23).  
During empirical research on discourses and strategies employed by pro- and 
anti-independence movements in Spain and the UK, four key concepts linked to 
Europeanization research—opportunity structures, vertical and horizontal 
Europeanization, and “usages of Europe”—emerged as relevant for addressing the 
question of how the EU as an actor or as a political institutional context affects 
contemporary secessionist politics within member states. The most fundamental of 
these concepts is that of “opportunity structure” which draws on a scholarly analysis 
of social movements (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Kriesi, 2007). It focuses on the 
effect of exogenous factors—i.e. the social, political or institutional environment in 
which groups operate—on the activities, influence and organization of collective 
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actors. Change in the external environment can alter the “structure of opportunity” for 
political action by enhancing or inhibiting prospects for mobilization, affecting the 
types of claims advanced or strategies pursued and the likely influence of collective 
actors.  
The notion that the EU, like other phenomena external to political movements, 
may provide opportunities and constraints which influence the conduct and success of 
those movements, provides the basis for operationalizing the core notion of 
“European integration effects” at the heart of the research question. In other words, in 
order to understand how European integration affects contemporary secessionist 
politics within EU member states the following research question can be posed: to 
what extent is European integration an opportunity or a constraint for contemporary 
secessionist movements and their opponents? 
The concept of “vertical Europeanization” focuses on institutional opportunity 
structures and the implications of the EU’s multi-level polity for mobilization and 
alliance building between domestic and extra-state actors. Developed in work on the 
Europeanization of the public sphere (Koopmans and Erbe, 2003; Koopmans and 
Statham, 2010), vertical Europeanization involves ‘communicative linkages between 
the national and the European level’ (Koopmans and Erbe, 2003: 6). In top-down 
vertical Europeanization, ‘European actors intervene in national public debates in the 
name of European regulations and common interests’. In the bottom-up variant, 
‘national actors address European actors and/or make claims on European issues’ 
(ibid). 
A role for the EU as an actor in domestic secession processes—and thus a 
rationale for ‘top-down’ vertical Europeanization—is bolstered by new states’ need to 
be recognized by existing states to obtain the privileges the international community 
accords with statehood. In theory, if not always in practice, EU co-ordination on 
recognition gives it a chance to influence the terms of secession (Caplan, 2005). 
Furthermore, now that Scottish and Catalan voters in particular have been asked to 
decide whether or not they want independence—in Scotland in a referendum, and in 
Catalonia, in the context of high-profile public debates—pro-independence 
campaigners have sought to authenticate the hypothetical argument that EU 
membership reduces uncertainty and costs of independence for small European states.  
Institutional rules empowering a variety of European actors in decisions about the 
enlargement of the EU—especially the European Commission and the European 
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Parliament, and national governments—make these actors authoritative arbiters in 
efforts to determine whether or not the EU will, in fact, facilitate independence. So 
far, the EU has not dealt with a situation where a new state separating from the 
territory of an existing member state seeks EU membership, and among legal scholars 
there is disagreement about the appropriate procedures for this unprecedented 
situation. Where EU membership is raised as an issue in independence debates, the 
views of actors likely to have a say in future accession processes may have significant 
implications; voters are likely to take those views into account when weighing up the 
likelihood that a new state will join the EU quickly and on favourable terms. 
In secession processes, domestic actors may thus have incentives to develop 
such “bottom up” vertical Europeanization strategies to try to influence the views of 
European actors that may have a say in future accession processes. Furthermore, 
domestic actors on either side of secession debates may have an incentive to try to 
reinforce or reconstruct what Bruno Coppieter (2010) refers to as a developing EU 
“strategic culture” on secession. He argues that, despite the continuing importance of 
an individual state’s historical experiences and priorities in its decisions on whether to 
recognize new states, and despite the many differences that emerge among member 
states when new states ask for recognition, the EU has developed a “strategic culture” 
on secession. This strategic culture is characterized by preferences for regional self-
government models respecting territorial integrity, for reformist and democratic 
(rather than violent secessionist) movements and “just cause” over “democratic 
choice” rationales for secession (2010: 255). Catalan and Scottish independence 
movements clearly go against EU preferences for regional self-government models 
respecting territorial integrity and against secession for reasons of ‘democratic choice’ 
and thus have incentives to try to alter this discourse. On the other hand, their 
opponents may mobilize it to bolster domestic anti-independence campaigns. 
Arguments focusing on the impact of discursive opportunity structures can be 
developed further with reference to theoretical work on “usages of Europe” (Woll and 
Jacquot, 2010) and horizontal Europeanization (Koopmans and Erbe, 2003; 
Koopmans and Statham, 2010).  The concept of “usages of Europe” asserts that the 
‘EU can become a vector of change by providing new resources, references and 
policy frames, which national actors use strategically’ (ibid: 113). In essence, the 
concept aims to highlight ‘how actors engage with, interpret, appropriate or ignore the 
dynamics of European integration’ through ‘social practices that seize the EU as a set 
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of opportunities’ (ibid: 116). As the following analysis shows, for instance, this 
concept is relevant for understanding how domestic actors mobilized arguments about 
blame for, and responsibility to respond to the consequences of, the financial crisis in 
Europe in debates about secession. It is also helpful for understanding forms of 
strategic usage of Europe which took the form of what Koopmans and Erbe (2003) 
and Koopmans and Statham (2010) define as horizontal Europeanization, which 
involves ‘communicative linkages between different European countries’ (Koopmans 
and Erbe, 2003: 6). Of particular interest here is what the authors define as a ‘strong 
variant’ of horizontal Europeanization which occurs when ‘actors from one country 
explicitly address or refer to actors or policies in another European country’ 
(Koopmans and Statham, 2010: 38). Such communicative links may take the form of 
domestic actors comparing their own situation with that in other countries as well as 
evaluating developments abroad. As I show below, the concept of horizontal 
Europeanization helps conceptualize the ways in which references to other 
secessionist movements may be used to: portray opponents in a negative light, and 
themselves in a positive light; mobilize participants within domestic movements; 
project possible future scenarios through reference to “success stories” and undermine 
the validity of opponent’s arguments. 
 
2. Lobbying on independence in Europe 
Longstanding experience of mobilization in the EU’s multi-level polity and the 
existence of organizational infrastructure and expertise in both Scotland and Catalonia 
permitted pro-independence movements to develop bottom-up lobbying strategies, 
principally focusing on European actors, to respond to difficulties in their domestic 
campaigns. This included mobilization of transnational networks and attempts to 
exploit EU treaty provisions permitting civil society actors to petition EU authorities. 
In Catalonia, governmental and civil society actors from the pro-independence 
campaigners developed extensive externalization strategies, mostly but not 
exclusively focusing on European actors. In addition to mobilizing the expertise of its 
academic appointees in the Consell Assessor per a la Transició (Advisory Council for 
the National Transition), the Catalan government mobilized dozens of its commercial 
and diplomatic offices abroad and its secretariat for foreign and European affairs to 
implement its externalization strategy. In late 2013, the Catalan government sent a 
letter to all EU heads of state and government and the EU Commission emphasizing 
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the high level of parliamentary and popular support for the referendum; contradicting 
Spanish government arguments that it was unconstitutional to hold a referendum on 
Catalan independence; and asking for support for ‘a peaceful, democratic and 
transparent European [referendum] process’ (Ríos, 2014). The Catalan government 
also sent a memorandum to the foreign ministers of 45 countries and ambassadors and 
consulates located in Madrid (ibid; Generalitat, 2013b). The content of the 
memorandum was similar to the letter to heads of state and government, with the 
notable exception of the memorandum’s attempts to counter arguments that Catalonia 
would ‘cease to be a member of the EU overnight’ if it separated from Spain. Catalan 
President Artur Mas exploited the symbolic potential of various visits to EU 
institutions (Ríos, 2013; Noguer, 2013e) (and foreign states like Israel and India) to 
allude to the goal of statehood, if not to directly search for supporters. In addition to a 
media campaign, including articles written by President Mas in major newspapers and 
meetings with international companies with an interest in the Catalan economy 
(Bassets, 2014), the Catalan government created an “amateur” diplomatic service, 
involving various municipal governments and private organizations, to make the case 
for Catalan independence abroad (Noguer, 2013c).  
Pro-independence civil society organizations, especially the high profile 
Assemblea Nactional Catalana (Catalan National Assembly, ANC), also pursued 
externalization strategies, not least through the activities of its ten branches in Europe 
and eight in other, mostly Latin American, countries. In addition to pro-independence 
videos and pamphlets (including one targeting football fans) in various languages, 
ANC organized mass pro-independence demonstrations which explicitly pursued, 
among other things, the goal of attracting wide international press attention (Roger, 
2013c). These included the above-mentioned demonstration in Barcelona on Catalan 
National Day (the Diada, 11 September 2012), which reportedly involved over 1.5 
million people and one, a year later, where demonstrators created a human chain 
stretching 400 kilometres across Catalonia under the slogan “Catalonia road to 
independence”. Furthermore, some 33,070 individuals signed an online petition which 
required President Obama to take a position on the right of the Catalan people to 
decide their future through a democratic referendum.
1
  
However, the response of the White House to this and other calls for support 
for an independence referendum show the limited impact of most of these initiatives. 
Initially, the leading Catalan nationalist parties, Convergència i Unió (Convergence 
Bourne, Europeanization and Secession 
103 
 
and Union, CiU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of 
Catalonia, ERC), appeared to pursue internationalization with the goal of co-opting 
European actors, principally through appeals to European legal principles, as 
intermediaries between Spanish and Catalan authorities (Roger, 2013a; Catalan 
parliament, 2013). However, it soon became clear that EU authorities and heads of 
state and government in Europe and beyond were unwilling to play such a role. The 
White House responded to the Catalan petition recognizing Catalan distinctiveness, 
but viewed the independence referendum as an internal Spanish matter that should be 
solved in accordance with Spanish law (Roger, 2014b). Political leaders in France 
(Cembrero, 2014), the UK and Germany (Müller and Oppenheimer, 2014), as well as 
Brussels (Roger, 2014a), made similar statements. Catalan government leaders later 
claimed that the goal of internationalization was to keep the international community 
informed about events in Catalonia and counter Spanish government claims about the 
unconstitutionality of an independence referendum, rather than obtain explicit 
statements of support from international actors (El País, 2013a; Noguer 2013d).  
In addition to wide international coverage of mass demonstrations like the 
Diada in 2012 and the Human Chain in 2013 (by, for example, The New York Times, 
CNN, the BBC and Reuters), one (short-lived) success came when Lithuania Prime 
Minister Algirdas Butkevicius affirmed, in reference to the Catalan case, that each 
country had ‘a right to self-determination’ and ‘should find their own way’. He also 
compared the 2012 Catalan Human Chain with a similar protest in the Soviet Union in 
1989. Pointing out that Lithuanians elaborated their own legal framework to proclaim 
their own independence, he also stated ‘I welcome all peaceful forms to express 
solidarity of peoples and self-determination’ (El País, 2013c). The Latvian Prime 
Minister Valdis Dombrovskis also appeared to support recognizing a new independent 
Catalan state (El País, 2013b).  
However, the Spanish foreign minister called in the Latvian and Lithuanian 
ambassadors to explain the statements, and governments from both countries 
subsequently retracted them, rejecting any interpretations that might lead to 
comparisons between the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States and the situation in 
Spain (El País, 2013d). These actions were part of a broader strategy to counter 
Catalan efforts to externalize independence debates. The Spanish foreign minister was 
reported to have intensified contacts with his counterparts abroad and to have called 
ambassadors from all EU countries (González, 2013) to explain the government’s 
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position on Catalan secession. Bilateral contacts, especially with French President 
François Hollande (Cembrero, 2014) and British Prime Minister David Cameron 
(Culla, 2013), culminated in public confirmation that these governments supported 
key elements of the Spanish government’s position, especially the “domestic” nature 
of the issue and the need for Catalonia to reapply for EU membership in case of 
secession. The Spanish Ministry for External Affairs and Cooperation produced a 
210-page report to the Catalan externalization strategy, which was sent to over 200 
Spanish embassies and consulates (Gobierno de España, 2014).  
The Scottish government also sought to externalize its pro-independence 
campaign, through, for example, meetings with diplomats in London, Edinburgh and 
Brussels (Carrell and Kassam, 2013; Carrell and Watt, 2013). The Scottish 
government was reported to be trying to find allies, especially among smaller Baltic, 
Scandinavian and East European EU members (Carrell, 2013f). Scottish government 
ministers made various trips abroad to Nordic and Baltic states to build ‘strong, 
collaborative relationships across Europe in line with our ambition to become a 
modern, independent country and full equal member state of the EU’ (Scottish 
government, 2013b). The Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond, and other Scottish 
government ministers, gave keynote addresses dealing with international aspects of 
Scottish independence in places such as Hong Kong, New York, Paris and 
Philadelphia. In a high profile, symbolically significant, speech in Bruges in April 
2014, Salmond sought to counter doubts about the likelihood of an independent 
Scotland staying in the EU with the argument that the Eurosceptic turn in British 
politics, signalled by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s earlier 
Bruges speech in 1988, was more likely to take Scotland out of the EU (with the UK) 
than Scottish independence itself (Salmond, 2014). Although the main pro-
independence civil society organization, Yes Scotland, described itself as primarily a 
domestic campaign,
2
 there were externalization initiatives by other groups. Artists 
from the pro-independence, National Collective, for instance, met with senior party 
leaders in Denmark in March 2014, resulting in public statements that Denmark 
would be likely to welcome Scotland into both the EU and NATO, and that 
membership could be arranged ‘overnight’ and was a ‘mere formality’ (Yes Scotland, 
2014d). Data collected suggests that the international dimension of the British 
government’s campaign against Scottish independence has primarily focused on 
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issuing joint statements with the Spanish president emphasizing that seceding states 
must leave the EU (Culla, 2013). 
There were also several attempts at transnational collaboration between pro-
independence campaigners. These included an (unsuccessful) attempt to register a 
European Citizens’ Initiative in favour of ‘internal enlargement’ in case of secession 
of a territory within an existing member state.
3
 In 2012, the International Commission 
for European Citizens, involving, inter alia, representatives from the Scottish 
Independence Convention and others from Flanders and Catalonia presented another 
(also unsuccessful) European Citizens’ Initiative to enshrine the universal right of 
self-determination within the EU’s legal framework.
4
  Pro-independence groups from 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland and Flanders formed the European 





3. Intervention of European actors in domestic secession debates 
The mainstream of Scottish and Catalan pro-independence movements favour EU 
membership after independence and, as such, the views of various EU actors likely to 
have a say in future accession processes are relevant for persuading voters that a new 
state will join the EU quickly and on favourable terms. If Scots voted “yes”, the 
Scottish government stated that it expected to begin negotiations with both the UK 
and EU institutions to agree a ‘smooth transition to independent EU membership 
[which] can take place on the day Scotland becomes an independent country’ 
(Scottish government, 2013a: 220). According to the Scottish government, following 
the referendum and during negotiations on independence, the Scottish government 
would have still remained within the UK, and by extension the EU, ‘without 
disrupting the continuity of Scotland’s current position inside the EU single market or 
rights and interests of EU citizens and business in Scotland’ (ibid: 220). It argued that 
Scotland’s 40-year EU membership meant that Article 49 of the Treaty on European 
Union (on accession of new states) did not apply in the sui generis case of Scotland. 
Rather, Article 48 could provide for treaty amendment facilitating Scottish 
membership agreed by common accord of representatives of the member states (ibid: 
221). The Scottish government also pursued ‘continuity of effect’, which sought to 
preserve current obligations (ibid: 221), including the UK’s budget rebate and opt-
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outs from economic and monetary union (EMU), justice and home affairs and the 
Schengen travel area (ibid: 222).  
Similarly, Catalan nationalist parties unambiguously sought to ‘construct 
Catalonia as a new state within the European framework’ (Catalan parliament, 2013; 
CiU and ERC, 2013), an ambition that was also articulated during mass rallies, like 
the 2011 Catalan national day demonstration under the slogan “Catalonia, a new state 
in Europe”. Catalan independence campaigners expected the EU to take a flexible 
approach as a result of for Catalonia’s long-standing EU membership and the sui 
generis nature of the independence processes (Generalitat, 2013b; Catalan National 
Assembly, 2014a; Noguer, 2013c). In an appeal to the “democratic principles” of the 
EU, Catalan pro-independence campaigners argued that the EU could not deny 
Catalans their status as EU citizens because they already formed part of the EU. The 
Catalan government also argued that the EU would not hesitate to accept Catalonia as 
a member given its economic strength.  
Although refusing to comment on individual cases, and claiming neutrality in 
a “domestic” matter, EU institutional representatives nevertheless contradicted the 
assumption that states seceding from existing members would automatically become 
EU members. Commissioners repeatedly outlined the view spelt out by Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso in a December 2012 letter to the UK’s House of 
Lords: 
[…] a new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, 
become a third country with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no 
longer apply on its territory. Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European 
Union, any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 
2 of the Treaty on European Union may apply to become a member of 
the EU. (The Scotsman, 2012) 
 
This position was both widely disseminated and restated on many occasions by other 
EU actors (see e.g. HM Government (UK), 2014; Roxburgh, 2013; Roger and Pérez, 
2013; Abellán, 2014; El País, 2013e), including Vice President of the European 
Commission, Joaquín Almunia (El Páis, 2012), internal market Commissioner Michel 
Barnier (Roger and Pérez, 2013) and European Council President Herman van 
Rompuy (Cué, 2013). EU support for anti-independence positions was also expressed 
symbolically, in events such as press conferences. For example, President of the 
European Council Herman van Rompuy was willing to restate the position at a press 
conference in Madrid alongside Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy on the day 
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Catalan nationalists announced a date and referendum question for an independence 
consultation (Cué, 2013). 
Their statements bolstered the position of the anti-independence movement in 
Spain and the UK. It permitted, for instance, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy 
to universalize EU-related arguments against independence: he claimed the view that 
Catalonia would not immediately join the EU was a position that was ‘clear to me, as 
it is for everybody else in the world’ (Carrell, 2013f). Similar universalizing formulas 
were employed by UK government representatives (Carrell and Kassam, 2013). 
Furthermore, Barrosso’s and Van Rompuy’s statements were cited, alongside other 
experts, in major British and Spanish government reports outlining purported costs of 
independence (HM Government (UK), 2014: 62; Gobierno de España, 2014: 105; 
214).  
The possibility that new states might face several years of limbo between 
independence and EU accession, and that they might need to renegotiate membership 
terms, led to the identification of additional problems. Other member states might 
disrupt accession negotiations or veto favourable accession terms, especially those 
(like Spain) with significant independence movements (Gutiérrez, 2013; Carrell and 
Kassam, 2013; HM Government (UK), 2014, 55; Abellán, 2013a; El País, 2013b).  
Catalonia’s euro membership might be compromised (El Páis, 2012; Abellán 2013a). 
Furthermore, other problems raised in debates included the possibility that Catalonia 
might have to reintroduce customs posts when forced to leave the Schengen Area and 
lose access to EU cohesion funding, while its citizens might lose the automatic right 
to move freely, or work and study, in other EU countries (Abellán, 2013a; Roger and 
Pérez, 2013). 
In Scotland, the unpopular prospect that an independent state would be obliged 
to join the EMU was raised repeatedly (Carrell and Watt, 2013; Carrell and Kassam, 
2013; HM Government (UK), 2014: 65). By remaining part of the UK, Scotland 
would be covered by the UK’s euro opt-out. Doubts were raised about whether a new 
Scottish state had to join the EU’s border-free Schengen Area, and thus introduce 
border controls between Scotland and other parts of the UK, as were doubts about 
whether Scotland would be able to keep a share of the UK’s annual EU budget rebate.  
 
4. The “Eurozone crisis” and lessons from other small nations  
As an indication of the complexity of Europeanization effects on the politics of 
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secession within EU member states, analysis of independence debates in the UK and 
Spain suggest that discursive usages of Europe can provide both opportunities and 
constraints for participants in secession processes. Below I outline two of the most 
prominent arguments employed during secession debates, which drew on “images of 
Europe” and involved “lesson drawing” from other European states  
 
4.1 The Eurozone crisis 
Both pro-independence and anti-independence advocates used negative experiences of 
the economic crisis in Europe to bolster arguments for their cause. Pro-independence 
advocates linked the depth of economic problems in their territory to central 
government handling of the crisis and argued that an independent Catalan or Scottish 
state would have responded better. Defending spending cuts introduced by his 
government, Catalan President Artur Mas argued, for instance, that: ‘We didn’t make 
cuts on a whim, they are imposed by Europe and badly distributed by Madrid’ 
(Noguer, 2012a). Similarly, Oriol Junqueras, leader of the Catalan nationalist party 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia) claimed ‘the only 
way out of the economic situation for Catalonia is for the community to have a state’ 
(Roger, 2013e). Similar arguments were made in Scotland, which is not part of a 
Eurozone state, but is part of a state with a government committed to reducing public 
spending to cut public deficits. The Deputy First Minister of Scotland, Nicola 
Sturgeon, argued that despite Scottish government efforts to mitigate central 
government welfare cuts, the current devolution settlement severely limited its scope 
for more radical action and the ‘only solution is for this parliament to have full 
powers of independence so that we can devise policies to benefit the Scottish people 
and ensure fair and decent support for all’ (Carrell, 2013d). First Minister Alex 
Salmond expressed similar sentiments (Carrell, 2013a).  
Anti-independence advocates also appealed to the crisis context. Leaders of 
the anti-independence Partido Popular emphasized the inappropriateness of 
launching an independence process during such a severe economic crisis (Garea, 
2012) while they, and others, expressed the fear that political instability and tensions 
created by independence debates could deepen the crisis (Manetto, 2013; and Noguer 
2012c). Similar arguments were made by Scottish anti-independence campaigners and 
British Prime Minister David Cameron (Carrell, 2013c). In Catalonia, such arguments 
were sometimes accompanied by the argument that the independence consultation 
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was a strategy employed by Catalan nationalist elites to distract attention from 
unpopular Catalan government cuts and economic downturn (Noguer 2012b, Pereda 
2012). 
However, one of the most prominent examples of how Europe was employed 
discursively to undermine arguments for independence can be found in the UK case. 
Here anti-independence campaigners relied ‘on the ‘image of Europe’ to 
communicate implicit content’ (Woll and Jacquot, 2010: 113-115). The Scottish 
government proposed maintaining a currency union with the rest of the UK in case of 
independence, in which ‘monetary policy will be set according to economic 
conditions across the Sterling Area with ownership and governance of the Bank of 
England undertaken on a shareholder basis’ (Scottish Government, 2013a: 110). The 
principal challenge to the credibility of the proposal is that the main British parties 
rejected it, but anti-independence campaigners also sought to undermine proposals for 
a Scotland-UK currency union by mobilizing negative images in Britain of the EU’s 
currency union. The clearest illustration of this strategy can be found in a pamphlet by 
the anti-Scottish independence organization, Better Together (2014a). The pamphlet 
mostly lists quotes from “experts” on problems with what it calls the ‘[Scottish 
National Party’s] plan for a Eurozone-style currency union’, a discursive formula 
employed repeatedly in the document. Narrations of problems experienced with the 
EU’s currency union were employed to illustrate the purported unworkability of the 
proposed currency unions between the UK and a future independent state. At least 
five negative lessons from the European sovereign debt crisis were applied to a future 
Scotland-UK currency union, in this and other documents analysed. (1) The 
difficulties of negotiating and managing (especially in times of crisis) a currency 
union among independent states (ibid: 2; Carrell, 2013e and 2014). A particular 
concern in this regard was uncertainty about whether, in a future financial crisis, the 
rest of the UK would so willingly bail out Scottish banks, as it did in 2008 for the 
Royal Bank of Scotland and Bank of Scotland (Better Together, 2014a: 4; Carrell, 
2013e). In a point emphasized by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, 
in a keynote speech (2) monetary unions need political union to work (Better 
Together, 2014a: 4; Elliot, 2014). This was particularly problematic insofar as it 
would undermine the goal of Scottish independence. A related point was the lesson 
that (3) there are systemic risks in monetary union if some members have less 
disciplined fiscal policies than other members, which would mean Scotland would 
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have to accept constraints in its decision-making over fiscal policy (Better Together, 
2014a; Carrell, 2013e). (4) Market uncertainty about new UK-Scotland currency 
union arrangements could lead to high volatility and market turbulence, capital flight 
and high borrowing costs for Scottish authorities (Better Together, 2014a, 6; Stewart, 
2013). (5) Some small nations have been overwhelmed by the global crisis (Better 
Together, 2014b), such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal. As a consequence, the anti-
Scottish independence movement argued that, by rejecting independence, Scots would 
continue to use a currency ‘which is one of the oldest and strongest and most 
successful currencies in the world’, one which meant the UK has ‘been protected from 
the worst of the Eurozone crisis’. Moreover, by staying in the UK, ‘[i]n these 
economically uncertain times, Scotland has the absolute reassurance that comes from 
the financial back up of being part of the UK’ (Better Together, 2014a, 2). 
 
4.2  Lesson drawing from the experience of other European states 
Analysis of statements by pro-independence campaigners in both Scotland and 
Catalonia referring to actors or policies in other countries (horizontal 
Europeanization) suggests that Europe can be used discursively to perform at least six 
different functions:  
1) Portray opponents in a negative light by comparing them with an exemplary 
other. For example, pro-Catalan independence campaigners frequently 
contrasted what they saw as the UK government’s willingness to negotiate, to 
tolerate political projects it disagreed with, and its pragmatic constitutional 
approach with the purportedly undemocratic “obstructionism” of the Spanish 
government. The Spanish government was seen to be “hiding behind” the 
provisions of the Spanish constitution to argue it could not authorize a Catalan 
independence referendum (Catalan National Council, 2014a and 2014b; 
Generalitat, 2014a).  
2) Portray the speaker’s movement in a positive light by comparing themselves 
with an exemplary other. In another mobilization of the Scottish case, pro-
Catalan independence campaigners sought to underline that Scottish and 
Catalan movements were peaceful, democratic movements (Roger and Pérez, 
2013). In an attempt to distance the Catalan case from events in Ukraine, 
Catalan authorities sought to invert established categories by combining 
function (1), implying that the Spanish government was more similar to 
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secessionists unwilling to rely solely on democratic methods to achieve their 
goals, with function (2), comparing Catalan authorities to the UK government 
by virtue of their commitment to democratic processes (Generalitat, 2014c).  
3) Mobilize participants in the speaker’s movement by relating successes of 
similar movements to their own experiences. This was explicit in the Catalan 
National Assembly’s human chain campaign in 2013 (mentioned above), 
directly inspired by mobilizations in 1990 where 100,000 citizens in Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia held hands to demand independence from the Soviet 
Union (Roger, 2013c and 2013d). It could be argued that restaging the “Baltic 
Way” in Catalonia not only sought, in reference to function (2), to reinforce 
the self-image of the Catalan movement as a peaceful, mass, democratic 
movement, but also to rally pro-independence supporters in an act explicitly 
referencing a key moment of an independence movement that achieved its 
goals (Noguer, 2013b; Generalitat, 2013c).  
4) Warn opponents of undesirable but possible future scenarios. While most 
Scottish and Catalan pro-independence campaigners avoided making, or 
specifically rejected, comparisons with violent secessionist processes in the 
Balkans (and Ukraine) (Generalitat, 2014c; Salmond, 2014; Yes Scotland, 
2014b), radical Catalan nationalist party ERC explicitly referred to Kosovo as 
a model. In a move communicating the dangers of the Spanish government’s 
refusal to hold a referendum, the ERC endorsed the extreme scenario of a 
unilateral declaration of independence—named the via Kosovar (Kosovan 
Way)—as a possible outcome if a referendum were not held (Roger 2013b). 
Similarly, in Scottish debates, references were also made to historic 
difficulties in Anglo-Irish relations, which were reported as veiled references 
to a conflict including bullying and intimidation (Watt, 2012) but also to the 
tragedy of the 1916 Easter Rising, the 1921 partition of Ireland and the 
Northern Ireland conflict, from which ‘the poison still drips’ (White, 2012).  
5) Underline the viability of Catalonia and Scotland as viable independent states. 
In both Catalonia and Scotland, pro-independence activists frequently referred 
to successes of small economically prosperous European states (Catalan 
National Assembly, 2014c; Generalitat, 2013a; Salmond, 2014). However, in 
the Scottish debates, the contours of the Nordic model were more sharply 
sketched. The Yes Scotland campaign, for instance, produced posters listing 
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nine small countries more prosperous than, and ten small states ranked as 
more safe and secure than, the UK. The countries included in both lists were 
Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland and Austria. Furthermore, pro-independence campaigners 
frequently alluded to the Scandinavian model, as one journalist put it, as ‘an 
enviable club of small independent states each flying its own flag […] with 
dynamic wealth creating societies, and high taxes that pay for strong welfare 
provision’ (Little, 2014). Various small, mostly Scandinavian states also 
provided models squaring the goal of many pro-independence campaigners for 
a nuclear-free Scotland with membership of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) (Scottish Independence Convention, 2014) and for 
defining a security identity in which a new Scottish army would contribute to 
international conflict resolution (ibid). The Nordic Council not only provided 
a forum for consolidating new alliances after independence, but served as a 
model for how an independent Scotland could peacefully manage relations 
with others in the British Isles (ibid; Little, 2014).  
6) Undermine the validity of opponent’s arguments. For example, Norway’s 
economic prosperity, despite being out of the EU (Scottish Independence 
Convention, 2014) and Norway’s oil wealth (Yes Scotland, 2014a) were also 
employed to counter opposition arguments about, respectively, the costs of 
being a non-EU member and the costs of maintaining a strong welfare state. 
Similarly, the Yes Scotland campaign produced a poster of the control-free 
border crossing between the UK and Ireland to counter the argument that an 
independent Scotland would require reintroduction of border controls, while 
Salmond pointed to strong UK-Irish relations as a model for Scottish-UK 
relations in case of independence (Salmond, 2014). In light of doubts raised 
about the timing and costs of accession to the EU, pro-independence 
campaigners also sought to argue for the arbitrariness of the Commission’s 
position (outlined above) with reference to the experience of other states. For 
instance, actors ranging from Catalan President Mas to the Yes Scotland 
campaign argued that the German Democratic Republic, which joined the EU 
in 1990 through unification with the Federal Republic of Germany, showed 
that rapid and flexible solutions to situations as unprecedented as those of 
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Scotland and Catalonia were possible (Roger and Pérez 2013; Yes Scotland, 
2014c).  
 
A number of differences between the cases can be observed. In an indication of the 
malleability of meanings that can be attached to secession experiences abroad, actors 
from different countries tended to select different fare from the same menu of 
contemporary and historical examples. Catalan and Scottish actors did not appeal to 
the same cases and referred to each other in varying degrees. Catalan campaigners 
referred to the Scottish case more than any other, while Scottish pro-independence 
campaigners generally paid scant attention to the Catalan case. Furthermore, pro-
Catalan independence activists appealed more to paradigmatic features of secession 
processes in Scotland (but also frequently the Baltic states), while pro-Scottish 
independence activists tended to project the success of a future Scottish state through 
association with success of other small European states, especially Nordic states and 
Ireland. These differences can be related partly to differences in the nature of 
secession processes. Doubts about the legal context for a Catalan consultation, meant 
pro-independence activists had stronger incentives to legitimize a Catalan referendum 
by referencing similarities with other processes recognized as legitimate by the 
international community. By contrast, the legitimacy of the Scottish referendum was 
not in doubt, so there were incentives to construct paradigmatic cases highlighting the 
advantages of independence and counteracting critiques put forward by opponents. 
Historical context was also relevant. For example, frequent references to the Irish case 
by pro-Scottish independence activists can be explained by the likelihood of audience 
familiarity, but also the fact that both Scottish and Irish nationalists, respectively, 
sought, or had sought, to separate from the United Kingdom.  
A second difference relates to the mobilization of negative images of the EU, 
and arguments raising fears of deeper integration into the EU in Scotland compared to 
those raising fears of an unravelling of EU ties in Catalonia. This reflects varying 
degrees of Euroscepticism in the two territories, which is much higher in the UK than 
in Scotland. The United Kingdom Independence Party is weak in Scotland and 
opinion polls show that Scots tend to be more Europhile than the English (Torrance, 
2013: 127). Nevertheless, Scottish attitudes tend to mirror those of the English on 
issues like withdrawal of the EU (in one study as many as 37% of Scots wanted to 
leave compared to 50% in England) and staying in the EU (in the same study as few 
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as 42% of Scots wanted to stay compared to about a third in England) (Curtis, cited in 
Torrance, 2013: 127). By contrast, in both Spain and Catalonia, there are no 
significant Eurosceptic parties and support for EU membership in both Catalonia and 
the rest of Spain is among the highest in the EU (Keating, 2001: 77).   
 
Conclusion 
In the article, I examine discourses and strategies mobilized by pro- and anti-
independence movements in the UK and Spain in order to assess the impact of the EU 
as an actor or as a political institutional context on contemporary secessionist politics 
within EU member states. Efforts by pro-independence campaigners to find allies that 
could help them to contest the construction of EU rules on enlargement as an obstacle 
to immediate EU membership on favourable terms, or in favour of the Scottish and 
Catalan “democratic choice” rationales for secession, produced meagre results. 
Leading statesmen and women emphasized the internal nature of independence issues 
and, particularly in Spain, the anti-independence campaign, led by the central 
government, was able to mobilize the diplomatic machinery of the state to apply 
pressure on states indicating support for Catalan independence. In practice, 
possibilities for lobbying and alliance formation beyond the state provided by the 
EU’s multi-level polity did not alter the structure of opportunity for pro-independence 
campaigners. Rather, the institutional prerogatives of anti-independence actors in the 
EU’s political and diplomatic systems (particularly when these were member state 
governments) provided anti-independence campaigners with resources not available 
to pro-independence counterparts.  
Similarly, intervention by European actors in secession debates ‘in the name 
of European regulations and common interests’ (Koopmans and Erbe, 2003: 6) 
became a considerable constraint for secession movements because European leaders 
refused to reassure voters that membership of the EU, an organization posited by pro-
independence campaigners as central to future prosperity, would be timely and 
favourable. Doubts created by EU actors about future membership provided 
opportunities for anti-independence campaigners to highlight variously conceived 
negative consequences of breaking away from existing states.  
Mobilization of negative images of EMU as politically difficult, contrary to 
the cause of independence, and problematic for small states provided a powerful 
metaphor employed by anti-independence campaigners about what might go wrong in 
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a currency union between a future independent Scottish state and the rest of the UK. 
However, pro-independence campaigners could also refer to the experience of other 
European states to bolster their cause by portraying opponents in a negative, and 
themselves in a positive, light; mobilizing participants in their movement; warning 
opponents; projecting possible positive future scenarios through reference to “success 
stories”; and undermining the validity of opponents’ arguments.  
In sum, the research generates the following conclusions. Firstly, the EU 
provides a complex web of opportunities and constraints for pro- and anti-
independence movements in the UK and Spain. The EU is both an arena for 
articulating claims and a source of allies, while appeals to images, histories and 
experiences of the EU and other European states can be mobilized as reasons for or 
against secession. Nevertheless, the EU appears to have provided more opportunities 
than constraints for anti-independence activists. In an indication of the relevance of 
Europe for contemporary secession movements, the research also showed how 
arguments and beliefs about Europe were actively employed in justifying or 
criticizing premises underpinning reasons to support or reject secession. What is not 
clear is how arguments and beliefs about Europe resonated with voting publics and, 
more specifically, the extent to which they were appropriated as reasons to support or 
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